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Abstract
We see a cut-free inﬁnitary sequent system for common knowledge. Its sequents are essentially trees and the
inference rules apply deeply inside of these trees. This allows to give a syntactic cut-elimination procedure
which yields an upper bound of ϕ20 on the depth of proofs, where ϕ is the Veblen function.
Keywords: common knowledge, cut elimination, inﬁnitary sequent calculus, deep sequents
1 Introduction
Common knowledge is a well-studied notion in epistemic logic, where modalities ex-
press knowledge of agents. Two standard textbooks on epistemic logic and common
knowledge in particular, are [6] by Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi and [12] by
Meyer and van der Hoek.
The fact that a proposition A is common knowledge can be expressed by the
inﬁnite conjunction ”all agents know A and all agents know that all agents know A
and so on”. In order to express this in a ﬁnite way we can use ﬁxpoints: common
knowledge of A is then deﬁned to be the greatest ﬁxpoint of λX.everybody knows
A and everybody knows X. This notion was introduced by Halpern and Moses [8]
and further studied in [6].
The traditional way to formalise common knowledge is to use a Hilbert-style
axiom system. Such a system has a ﬁxpoint axiom, which states that common
knowledge is a ﬁxpoint, and an induction rule, which states that this ﬁxpoint is
the greatest ﬁxpoint. However, this approach does not work well for designing a
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Gentzen-style sequent calculus. In particular, Alberucci and Ja¨ger show in [2] that
a cut-free sequent system designed in this way is not complete.
To obtain a complete cut-free system Alberucci and Ja¨ger replace the induction
rule by an inﬁnitary ω-rule. This results in a system in which common knowledge
is a greatest ﬁxpoint. Although this system has been further studied in [11,9], no
syntactic cut-elimination procedure has been found. Cut-elimination was proved
only indirectly by showing completeness of the cut-free system.
In the present paper, we give a syntactic cut-elimination procedure for an in-
ﬁnitary system of common knowledge. Since our deductive system for common
knowledge includes an ω-rule with inﬁnitely many premises, we have proofs of
transﬁnite depth. We will also assign transﬁnite ranks to formulas. We obtain
our cut-elimination result by using the method of predicative cut-elimination, see
Pohlers [14,15] and Schu¨tte [17], which is a standard tool for the proof-theoretic
analysis of systems of set theory and second order number theory.
In our system we use deep sequents which are essentially trees and where rules ap-
ply anywhere deep inside of these trees. The general idea of applying rules deeply has
been proposed several times in diﬀerent forms and for diﬀerent purposes. Schu¨tte
already used it in order to obtain systems without contraction and weakening, which
he considered more elegant [16]. Guglielmi used it to give a proof-theoretic system
for a certain substructural logic which cannot be captured in the sequent calcu-
lus. To do so, he developed the calculus of structures, a formalism which is centered
around deep inference and abolishes the traditional format of sequent calculus proofs
[7]. The calculus of structures then has also been developed for modal logic [18].
Based on these ideas, Bru¨nnler introduced the notion of deep sequent and gave a
systematic set of sequent systems and a corresponding cut-elimination procedure
for the modal logics between K and S5 [5]. Kashima had used the same notion
of sequent already in [10] in order to give cut-free sequent systems for some tense
logics.
Several cut-free systems for logics with common knowledge exist already. The
one that is closest to our system was introduced by Tanaka in [19] for predicate
common knowledge logic and is based on Kashima’s ideas. It essentially also uses
what we call deep sequents. In fact, if one disregards the rather diﬀerent notation
and some choices in the formulation of rules, then one could say that our system is
the propositional part of Tanaka’s system. There are also ﬁnitary systems. Abate,
Gore´ and Widmann, for example, introduce a cut-free tableau system for common
knowledge in [1]. Cut-free system have also been studied in the context of explicit
modal logic by Artemov [4] and by Antonakos [3].
However, we do not know of syntactic cut-elimination procedures for any of the
systems mentioned. Typically, cut-elimination is established only indirectly. There
are cut-elimination procedures for similar logics, for example by Pliuskevicius’ for
an inﬁnitary system for linear time temporal logic in [13]. For linear temporal logic
he does not need deep sequents. For this logic it is enough to use indexed formulas
of the form Ai which denotes A at the i-th moment in time.
The paper is organised as follows. We ﬁrst present our deep sequent system for
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common knowledge and prove the invertibility of its rules and the admissibility of
the structural rules. Then we embed the Hilbert system for common knowledge into
our deep sequent system, which gives us completeness. The main part of the paper
is devoted to establishing the reduction lemma, then the cut-elimination theorem
follows from that in the standard way. As a result we obtain an upper bound for
the depth of proofs in our system. Some discussion about future work ends this
paper.
2 The Deep Sequent System
Formulas. We are considering a language with h agents for some h > 0. Propo-
sitions p and their negations p¯ are atoms, with p¯ deﬁned to be p. Formulas are
denoted by A,B,C,D. They are given by the following grammar:
A ::= p | p¯ | (A ∨A) | (A ∧A) | iA | iA | ∗A | ∗A ,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ h. The formula iA is read as “agent i knows A” and the formula
∗A is read as “A is common knowledge”. The connectives i and ∗ have i and
∗ as their respective De Morgan duals.
Given a formula A, its negation A¯ is deﬁned as usual using the De Morgan laws,
A ⊃ B is deﬁned as A¯ ∨ B and ⊥ is deﬁned as p ∧ p¯ for some proposition p. The
formula A is an abbreviation for “everybody knows A”:
A = 1A ∧ . . . ∧hA and A = 1A ∨ . . . ∨hA.
A sequence of n ≥ 0 modal connectives can be abbreviated, for example

nA =  . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
A
Formula rank. For a formula A we deﬁne its rank rk(A) as follows:
rk(p) = rk(p¯) = 0
rk(A ∧B) = rk(A ∨B) = max (rk (A), rk (B)) + 1
rk(iA) = rk(iA) = rk(A) + 1
rk( ∗A) = rk( ∗A) = ω + rk(A)
Lemma 2.1 (Some properties of the rank) For all formulas A we have that
(i) rk(A) = rk(A¯),
(ii) there are m,n < ω such that rk(A) = ω ·m + n,
(iii) for all k < ω we have rk(kA) < rk( ∗A).
Proof. Statements (i) and (ii) are immediate. For (iii), an induction on k yields
that rk(kA) = rk(A) + k · h. By (ii) it is then enough to check that for all k we
have ω ·m + n + k · h < ω + ω ·m + n. 
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Deep sequents. A (deep) sequent is a ﬁnite multiset of formulas and boxed
sequents. A boxed sequent is an expression [Γ]i where Γ is a sequent and 1 ≤ i ≤ h.
Sequents are denoted by Γ,Δ,Λ,Π,Σ. A sequent is always of the form
A1, . . . , Am, [Δ1]i1 , . . . , [Δn]in ,
where the ij denote agents and thus range from 1 to h. As usual, the comma
denotes multiset union and there is no distinction between a singleton multiset and
its element. The corresponding formula of the above sequent is ⊥ if m = n = 0 and
otherwise
A1 ∨ · · · ∨Am ∨i1D1 ∨ · · · ∨inDn ,
where D1 . . . Dn are the corresponding formulas of the sequents Δ1 . . .Δn. Often we
do not distinguish between a sequent and its corresponding formula, e.g. a model of
a sequent is a model of its corresponding formula. A sequent has a corresponding
tree whose nodes are marked with multisets of formulas and whose edges are marked
with agents. The corresponding tree of the above sequent is
{A1, . . . , Am}
i1
i2 in−1
in
tree(Δ1) tree(Δ2) . . . tree(Δn−1) tree(Δn)
,
where tree(Δ1) . . . tree(Δn) are the corresponding trees of Δ1 . . .Δn. Often we do
not distinguish between a sequent and its corresponding tree, e.g. the root of a
sequent is the root of its corresponding tree.
Sequent contexts. A context is a sequent with exactly one occurrence of the
symbol { }, the hole, which does not occur inside formulas. Such contexts are
denoted by Γ{ }, Δ{ }, and so on. The hole is also called the empty context.
The sequent Γ{Δ} is obtained by replacing { } inside Γ{ } by Δ. For example, if
Γ{ } = A, [[B], { }] and Δ = C, [D] then
Γ{Δ} = A, [[B], C, [D]] .
Inference rules. In an instance of the inference rule ρ
ρ
Γ1 Γ2 . . .
Δ
we call Γ1,Γ2 . . . its premises and Δ its conclusion. An axiom is a rule without
premises. We will not distinguish between an axiom and its conclusion. A system,
denoted by S, is a set of rules. Figure 1 shows system DC, our inﬁnitary deep
sequent calculus for the logic of common knowledge.
Derivations and proofs. A tree is well-founded if it does not have an inﬁnite
path. A derivation in a system S is a well-founded tree whose nodes are labelled
with sequents and which is built according to the inference rules from S. Derivations
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Fig. 1. System DC
nec
Γ
[Γ]i
wk
Γ{∅}
Γ{Δ}
ctr
Γ{Δ,Δ}
Γ{Δ}
cut
Γ{A} Γ{A¯}
Γ{∅}
Fig. 2. Necessitation, weakening, contraction and cut
are visualised as upward-growing trees, so the root is at the bottom. The sequent
at the root is the conclusion and the sequents at the leaves are the premises of the
derivation. A proof of a sequent Γ in a system is a derivation in this system with
conclusion Γ where all leaves are axioms. We write S 	 Γ if there is a proof of Γ in
system S.
Cut rank. The cut rank of an instance of cut as shown in Figure 2 is the rank
of its cut formula A. For an ordinal γ we deﬁne the rule cutγ which is cut with at
most rank γ and the rule cut<γ which is cut with a rank strictly smaller than γ.
The cut rank of a derivation is the supremum of the cut ranks of its cuts. For a
system S and ordinals α and γ and a sequent Γ we write S
α
γ
Γ to say that there
is a proof of Γ in system S + cut<γ with depth bounded by α.
Admissibility and invertibility. An inference rule ρ with premises Γ1,Γ2 . . .
and conclusion Δ is depth- and cut-rank-preserving admissible for a system S if
whenever S
α
γ
Γi for each premise Γi then S
α
γ
Δ. For each rule ρ there is its
inverse, denoted by ρ¯, which has the conclusion of ρ as its only premise and any
premise of ρ as its conclusion. An inference rule ρ is depth- and cut-rank-preserving
invertible for a system S if γ¯ is depth- and cut-rank preserving admissible for S.
In the following, we sometimes omit the “depth- and cut-rank preserving” before
either admissible or invertible. Figure 2 shows the structural rules necessitation,
weakening and contraction, which are admissible for system DC.
Lemma 2.2 (Admissibility of the structural rules) For system DC the follow-
ing hold:
Γ{ ∗A}Γ{ ∗A}
∗
Γ{ ∗A,kA}
Γ{iA, [Δ]i}
∗
Γ{kA} for all k ≥ 1
Γ{iA}
i
Γ{iA, [Δ, A]i}
Γ{A ∨B}
i
Γ{[A]i}
Γ{A ∧B}
∨
Γ{A,B}
Γ{a, a¯} ∧
Γ{A} Γ{B}
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(i) The necessitation rule is depth- and cut-rank-preserving admissible.
(ii) The weakening rule is depth- and cut-rank-preserving admissible.
(iii) All rules are depth- and cut-rank-preserving invertible.
(iv) The contraction rule is depth- and cut-rank-preserving admissible.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from a routine induction on the depth of the proof. The
same works for the ∧,∨,i and ∗-rules in (iii). The inverses of all other rules are
just weakenings. For (iv) we also proceed by induction on the depth of the proof
tree, using invertibility of the rules. The cases for the propositional rules and for
the i, ∗, ∗-rules are trivial. For the i-rule we consider the formula iA from its
conclusion Γ{iA, [Δ]i} and its position inside the premise of contraction Λ{Σ,Σ}.
We have the cases 1) iA is inside Σ or 2) iA is inside Λ{ }. We have three
subcases for case 1: 1.1) [Δ]i inside Λ{ }, 1.2) [Δ]i inside Σ, 1.3) Σ,Σ inside [Δ]i.
There are two subcases of case 2: 2.1) [Δ]i inside Λ{ } and 2.2) [Δ]i inside Σ. All
cases are either simpler than or similar to case 2.2, which is as follows:
Λ′{iA,Σ
′, [Δ, A]i,Σ
′, [Δ]i}
i
Λ′{iA,Σ
′, [Δ]i,Σ
′, [Δ]i}
ctr
Λ′{iA,Σ
′, [Δ]i}

Λ′{iA,Σ
′, [Δ, A]i,Σ
′, [Δ]i}
¯i
Λ′{iA,Σ
′, [Δ, A]i,Σ
′, [Δ, A]i}
ctr
Λ′{iA,Σ
′, [Δ, A]i}
i
Λ′{iA,Σ
′, [Δ]i}
,
where the instance of ¯i in the proof on the right is removed because it is depth-
preserving admissible and the instance of contraction is removed by the induction
hypothesis. 
Lemma 2.3 (Admissibility of the general identity axiom) For all contexts Γ{ }
and all formulas A we have DC
2·rk(A)
0 Γ{A, A¯}.
Proof. We perform an induction on rk(A) and a case analysis on the main connec-
tive of A. The cases for atoms and for the propositional connectives are obvious.
For A = iB and A = ∗B we respectively have
Γ{[B, B¯]i,iB¯}
i
Γ{[B]i,iB¯}
i
Γ{iB,iB¯}
and
...
Γ{kB,kB¯}
∗
Γ{kB, ∗B¯}
...
∗ 1≤k<ω
Γ{ ∗B, ∗B¯}
.
On the left by induction hypothesis we get a proof of the premise of depth 2 · rk (B)
and thus a proof of the conclusion of depth 2·rk (B)+2 = 2·(rk (B)+1) = 2·rk (iB).
On the right by Lemma 2.1 we can apply the induction hypothesis for each premise
to get a proof of depth 2 · rk(kB) = 2 · (rk(B) + k · h) and thus a proof of the
conclusion of depth 2 · (rk (B) + ω) ≤ 2 · (ω + rk(B)) = 2 · rk( ∗B). 
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3 Embedding the Hilbert System
In this section we introduce the Hilbert system HC which is essentially the same as
system KCh from the book [6]. System HC is obtained from some Hilbert system
for classical propositional logic by adding the axioms and rules shown in Figure 3.
Soundness and completeness for HC is shown in [6]. We will now embed HC into DC
and thus establish completeness of DC. We omit a deﬁnition of the semantics and
a proof of soundness of DC. We feel that it is straightforward and would not add
much to the current paper.
Fig. 3. System HC
Theorem 3.1 For each formula A if HC 	 A then there are m,n < ω such that
DC
ω·m
ω·n A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation in HC. If A is
a propositional axiom of HC then there is a ﬁnite derivation of A in system DC
such that all premises are instances of the general identity axiom. Thus we obtain
DC
ω·m
0 A for some m < ω by admissibility of the general identity axiom (Lemma
2.3).
If A is an instance of (K), then we obtain DC
ω·m
0 A for some m < ω from the
following derivation and admissibility of the general identity axiom to take care of
the premises.
iA¯,i(A ∧ B¯), [B,A, A¯]i
i
iA¯,i(A ∧ B¯), [B,A]i iA¯,i(A ∧ B¯), [B, B¯]i
∧
iA¯,i(A ∧ B¯), [B,A ∧ B¯]i
i
iA¯,i(A ∧ B¯), [B]i
i
iA¯,i(A ∧ B¯),iB
∨2
iA ∧i(A ⊃ B) ⊃ iB
If A is an instance of (CCL), then we obtain DC
ω·m
0 A for some m < ω from the
following derivation and again admissibility of the general identity axiom to take
care of the premises. An argument similar to the one used to derive the general
identity axiom guarantees that all premises of the ∗ rule are derivable with depth
smaller than rk( ∗A).
iAB
(NEC)
A
B ⊃ ∗A
(MP)
A A ⊃ B
(K) iA ∧i(A ⊃ B) ⊃ iB (CCL) ∗A ⊃ (A ∧ ∗A)
(IND)
B ⊃ (A ∧B)
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A¯,A
∗,wk
∗A¯,A
...
...
[kA¯,kA]i
i,wk
i
kA¯, [kA]i
∨,wk

k+1A¯, [kA]i
∗,wk
∗A¯, [kA]i
...
∗ 1≤k<ω
∗A¯, [ ∗A]i
i
∗A¯,i ∗A
...
∧ 1≤i≤h
∗A¯, ∗A
∧
∗A¯,A ∧ ∗A
∨
∗A ⊃ (A ∧ ∗A)
If the last rule in the derivation is an instance of (MP), then by the induction
hypothesis there are m1,m2, n1, n2 < ω such that DC
ω·m1
ω·n1
A and DC
ω·m2
ω·n2
A ⊃ B.
Thus we get DC
ω·m1
ω·n1
A,B by weakening admissibility and DC
ω·m2
ω·n2
A¯,B by
invertibility. An application of cut yields DC
ω·m
ω·n B for m = max (m1,m2) + 1 and
n = max (n1, n2, rk(B) + 1).
If the last rule in the derivation is an instance of (NEC), then the claim follows
from the induction hypothesis, the fact that nec is cut-rank- and depth-preserving
admissible, and an application of i.
If the last rule in the derivation is an instance of (IND), then by the induction
hypothesis there are m1, n1 < ω such that DC
ω·m1
ω·n1
B ⊃ (A ∧ B). Then by
invertibility of the ∧- and ∨-rules we obtain
1) DC
ω·m1
ω·n1
B¯,B and 2) DC
ω·m1
ω·n1
B¯,A.
Let n2 be such that rk(B) < ω · n2. We set n = max (n1, n2). By induction on k
we show that for all k ≥ 1 there is an m2 < ω such that DC
ω·m1+m2
ω·n B¯,
kA. The
case k = 1 is given by 2) and the induction step is as follows:
B¯,B
...
B¯,kA
nec
[B¯,kA]i
i,wk
iB¯, [
kA]i
i
iB¯,i
kA
∨,wk
B¯,i
kA
...
∧ 1≤i≤h
B¯,k+1A
cut
B¯,k+1A ,
where the premise on the left is 1) and the premise on the right follows by induction
hypothesis. The claim follows by applications of ∗ and ∨. 
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4 Cut-Elimination
We write α#β for the natural sum of α and β. The natural sum is commutative
because it does not cancel additive components, in contrast to the ordinary ordinal
sum Intuitively, the natural sum is the most natural generalisation of addition from
natural numbers to ordinal number if one wants to keep commutativity. For an
introduction to ordinals, and a deﬁnition of the natural sum in particular, we refer
to Schu¨tte [17]. The binary Veblen function ϕ is generated inductively as follows:
(i) ϕ0β := ω
β,
(ii) if α > 0, then ϕαβ denotes the βth common ﬁxpoint of the functions λξ.ϕγξ
for γ < α.
The Veblen function allows us to name ordinal numbers. First, notice that by using
terms built from natural numbers and ω by addition, multiplication and exponenti-
ation we cannot name any ordinal α such that ωα = α. All of them are greater than
any ordinal that we can name. To name them, the ε-function has been introduced,
where εβ is the β-th ordinal α such that ω
α = α. Gentzen’s famous result is that
the strength of Peano arithmetic is ε0. For our purposes we have to go a little bit
further than the ε-function. We need the Veblen function, which is a generalisation
of the ε-function: ϕ1α = εα.
Given a proof π we denote its depth by |π|. We write
α
β
Γ for DC
α
β
Γ.
Lemma 4.1 (Reduction Lemma) If there is a proof
π1
Γ{A}
π2
Γ{A¯}
cutγ
Γ{∅}
with π1 and π2 in DC + cut<γ then
|π1|# |π2|
γ
Γ{∅} .
Proof. By induction on |π1|# |π2|. We perform a case analysis on the two lower-
most rules in the given proofs. If one of the two rules is passive and an axiom then
Γ{∅} is axiomatic as well. If one is active and an axiom then we have
Γ{a, a¯}
π2
Γ{a¯, a¯}
cut0
Γ{a¯}

π2
Γ{a¯, a¯}
ctr
Γ{a¯}
,
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and by contraction admissibility we have
|π2|
γ
Γ{a¯} and thus
|π1|# |π2|
γ
Γ{a¯}. If
some rule ρ is passive then we have
π1
Γ{A}
...
π2i
Γi{A¯}
...
ρ
Γ{A¯}
cutγ
Γ{∅}

...
π1
Γ{A}
ρ¯
Γi{A}
π2i
Γi{A¯}
cutγ
Γi{∅}
...
ρ
Γ{∅}
,
where i ranges from 1 to the number of premises of ρ. By invertibility of ρ we get
|π1|
γ
Γi{A}, thus by induction hypothesis
|π1|# |π2i|
γ
Γi{∅} for all i and by ρ we get
|π1|# |π2|
γ
Γ{∅}.
This leaves the case that both rules are active and not axioms. We have:
(∧ − ∨):
π11
Γ{B}
π12
Γ{C}
∧
Γ{B ∧C}
π21
Γ{B¯, C¯}
∨
Γ{B¯ ∨ C¯}
cutσ+1
Γ{∅}

π11
Γ{B}
π12
Γ{C}
wk
Γ{B¯, C}
π21
Γ{B¯, C¯}
cutσ
Γ{B¯}
cutσ
Γ{∅}
,
where by weakening admissibility we get
|π12|
γ
Γ{B¯, C}, and since σ < σ + 1 = γ
we get
α
γ
Γ{∅} for α = max (|π11|,max (|π12|, |π21|)+1)+1. It is easy to check that
α ≤ |π1|# |π2|.
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(i −i):
π11
Γ{[Δ]i, [A]i}
i
Γ{[Δ]i,iA}
π21
Γ{[Δ, A¯]i,iA¯}

Γ{[Δ]i,iA¯}
cutσ+1
Γ{[Δ]i}

π11
Γ{[Δ]i, [A]i}
wk
2
Γ{[Δ, A]i, [Δ, A]i}
ctr
Γ{[Δ, A]i}
π11
Γ{[Δ]i, [A]i}
wk,i
Γ{[Δ, A¯]i,iA}
π21
Γ{[Δ, A¯]i,iA¯}
cutσ+1
Γ{[Δ, A¯]i}
cutσ
Γ{[Δ]i}
,
where the premises of the upper cut have been derived by use of weakening ad-
missibility with depth |π11|+ 1 and |π21|, the natural sum of which is smaller than
|π1|# |π2|. The induction hypothesis thus yields
(|π11|+1)# |π21|
γ
Γ{[Δ, A¯]i} and since
σ < σ + 1 = γ we get
|π1|# |π2|
γ
Γ{[Δ]i} by the lower cut.
( ∗− ∗):
...
π1k
Γ{kA}
...
∗ k<ω
Γ{ ∗A}
π21
Γ{ ∗A¯,jA¯}
∗
Γ{ ∗A¯}
cutω+σ
Γ{∅}

π1j
Γ{jA}
...
π1k
Γ{kA}
wk
Γ{kA,jA¯}
...
∗ k<ω
Γ{ ∗A,jA¯}
π21
Γ{ ∗A¯,jA¯}
cutω+σ
Γ{jA¯}
cutσ+(j·h)
Γ{∅}
,
where the induction hypothesis applied on the upper cut gives us
|π1|# |π21|
γ
Γ{jA¯}
and since by Lemma 2.1 we have σ + j · h < ω + σ = γ the lower cut yields
|π1|# |π2|
γ
Γ{∅}. 
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From the reduction lemma we obtain the ﬁrst and the second elimination lemma
as usual, see for instance Pohlers [14,15] or Schu¨tte [17].
Lemma 4.2 (First Elimination Lemma) If
α
γ+1 Γ then
2α
γ
Γ.
Lemma 4.3 (Second Elimination Lemma) If
α
β+ωγ Γ then
ϕγα
β
Γ.
The embedding of the Hilbert system into the deep sequent system together
with the second elimination lemma gives us the cut elimination theorem.
Theorem 4.4 (Cut Elimination) If A is a valid formula, then
ϕ20
0 A.
Proof. Let A be a valid formula. By the embedding of the Hilbert system into the
deep sequent system, there are natural numbers m,n such that DC
ω·m
ω·n A. By the
second elimination lemma we obtain DC
α
0 A where α = ϕ1(. . . (ϕ1(ω ·m)) . . .). We
know ϕβ1γ1 < ϕβ2γ2 if β1 < β2 and γ1 < ϕβ2γ2. Thus α < ϕ20. 
5 Conclusion
We have introduced an inﬁnitary deep sequent system for common knowledge and
a syntactic cut-elimination procedure for it. We embedded the Hilbert style system
and obtained ϕ20 as upper bound on the length of cut-free proofs for valid formulas.
To draw some more conclusions, let us look at the problem of cut elimination
in the ordinary sequent calculus, for example in the one by Alberucci and Ja¨ger. It
has the following i-rule:
i
A,Γ, ∗Δ
iA,iΓ, ∗Δ,Σ
,
where Γ,Δ and Σ are sets of formulas andiΓ is {iA |A ∈ Γ}. The problem here is
the context restriction. Consider the following proof, where the cut is multiplicative
(context-splitting)
π1
A,Γ, ∗B¯
i
iA,iΓ,Σ, ∗B¯
...
π2k

kB,Δ
...
∗ 1≤k<ω
∗B,Δ
cut
iA,iΓ,Σ,Δ
Here the inference rule above the cut on the left does not apply to the cut formula
while the inference rule on the right does. The typical transformation would push
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the left rule instance below the cut, as follows:
π1
A,Γ, ∗B¯
...
π2k

kB,Δ
...
∗ 1≤k<ω
∗B,Δ
cut
A,Γ,Δ
i
iA,iΓ,Σ,iΔ
However, this transformation introduces the i in iΔ, and thus it does not
yield a proof of the original conclusion. This is caused by the context restriction in
the i-rule. Such a context restriction also occurs in the standard sequent calculus
for the modal logic K. While it is hardly elegant, at least it does not cause any
diﬃculties for syntactic cut-elimination for K. However, we see that the context
restriction poses a genuine problem for logics with more modalities like in the logic
of common knowledge. Our more general format for sequents and inference rules
solves the problem since it does not require context restrictions.
The ﬁrst item on the list of future work is of course to embed our cut-free deep
sequent system into the ordinary cut-free sequent system by Alberucci and Ja¨ger.
This would yield a syntactic cut-elimination procedure for their system, since the
embeddings with cut are straightforward. We think we know how to do this, but we
still have to check the details. The second item on the list is cut-elimination for a
system for S5-based common knowledge. After all, S5 is the system for knowledge,
and deep sequents easily handle S5. Generalising contexts to allow two holes, the
rule to add would be
S5
Γ{A}{A}
Γ{A}{∅}
.
After that, questions become more speculative. What is the mathematical mean-
ing of the upper bound on the depth of cut-free proofs? Is there a kind of bound-
edness lemma in modal logic similar to the one used in the analysis of set theories
and second order arithmetic? Is ϕ20 the best possible upper bound on the depth
of proofs? What would be the equivalent of a well-ordering proof in modal logic?
And ﬁnally, how could one syntactically eliminate cuts in a ﬁnitary system?
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